Representation
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Representation



On this page:  {The 4 priniciples of Ultraism}
 



W.J.T. Mitchell

Source:  "Critical Terms for Literary Study" ed. by
         Frank Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin, 2nd Ed,
Univ. Chicago Press, ISBN 0.227.47203.5 (Chicago, 1995).

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P. 11

Probaby the most common and naive intuition about literature
is that is a "representation of life". Unlike many of the 
terms in this collection [ie, the edited book], "representation"
has always played a central role in the understanding of 
literature. Indeed, one might say that it has played the 
definitive role in-so-far-as the founding fathers of 
literary thoery, Plato and Aristotle, regarded literature 
as simply one ofrm of representation. 

Aristotle defined the arts -- verbal, visual and musical --
as modes of representation, and went even further to make
representation the definitevly human activity:

   From childhood, men have an instict for 
   representation, and in this respect man
   differs from the other animals that he 
   is far more imitative and learns his 
   first lessons by reprenting things.

[I would argue that he IMITATES things, mimics, etc,
 as the method by which he learns]

Man, for many philosophers both ancient and modern, is
the "representational animal", homo symbolicum, the
creature whose distincitve character is the creation and
manipulation of signs -- things that "stand for" or
"take the place of" something else.

Since antiquity, then, representation has been the 
foundational concept in aesthetics (the general 
theory of the arts) and semiotics (the general theory 
of signs). In the modern era (ie, in the last 300 years),
it has also become a crucial concept in political theory,
forming the conerstone of representational theories of
sovereignty, legislatie authority, and relations of 
individuals to the state. We now thing of "representative
government" and the accountability of representaitves to 
their constituents as fundamental postulates of modern
government. One obvious question that comes up in
contemporary theories of representation, consequently, 
is the relationship betweeen aesthetic and semiotic 
representation (things that "stand for" other things) 
and political representation (persons "who act for"
other persons). And one obvious place where these two
forms of *representation* come together is theatre,
where persons (actors) stand for or "impersonate"
other (usually fictional) persons.

[Obviously though, in dance, etc a person (or even a thing)
could represent an idea, concept, mood, object; eg, I
could play the part of a door knob]

There are v ast differences, of course, between Lawrence
Oliver playing Hamlet and Ronald Reagan playing the role
of president -- the difference, say between playing and
real life; between script and an open, impoverished
performance; or between an aesthetic contract and a legal
one -- but, these should not blind us to the structural
similarities of the two forms of representation or to 
the complex interatction between playful fantasy and 
serious reality in all forms of representation. The fact
that Ronald Reagan began his career as an actor hand has
continually exploited the symbolic, theatrical character
of the presidency only makes the links between the
aesthetic/semiotic and political forms of representation
more un-avoidable.

What is the "structure" that is common to both the political
and semiotic forms of representation? 

[ed: Line-breaks inserted freely below]

One way to think of it is as a triangular relationship:

representation is always:   Of something or someone,
                            By something or someone,
                            To something or someone.

It seems that only the third angle of representation
need be a person [???why???] -- we can represent stones
with dabs of paint or letters or sounds, but we can
represent things only to people. The other two
angles can be occupied by people but need not be: I can 
represent a man with a stone, or a stone with a man; but,
it would seem very odd to speak of representing either
a stone or a man to a stone. 

[hmmm, and there's the idea of metaphore -- esp as
 WRITTEN text  
                  +---------------+
                  | MAN = STONE   |
                  +---------------+
 And of course this "to-ness" begs the anthro-po-centric
 view that humans have. (Few of them talk to trees, let
 alone trees.  I mean, it's at this point, that you can
 *really* begin to see just how FAR we have to go yet!
 So, can we not think it odd to present (represent) a
 stone to a bird?  Or to present (represent) a song to 
 a fish?
 ]

                           Dab of paint
                              / | \
                             / R|  \
                            /  E|   \
                           /   P|    \
                          /    .|     \
                   Maker /-------------\ Beholder
                         \      |      /
                          \     |     / 
                           \    |    /
                            \   |   /
                             \  |  /
                              Stone

There also may be a 4th dimension to representation not 
captured by oour tiangle, and that would be the "intender"
or "maker" of the representation

[Again with the Bower bird!!!!]

(tired of all of this mishigaz!, must work!!!!!!)


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